Electronically Filed

1/27/2020 4:15 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk ofthe Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

In the

SUPREME COURT
0f the

STATE OF IDAHO

Idaho Supreme Court

DOCKET NO. 47286-2019

JONATHON FRANTZ,
Appellant,
V.

DAVID A. OSBORN and NAOMI OSBORN,
Respondents.

Appealedfrom the District Court ofthe First Judicial District ofthe State ofldaho,
for the County ofKootenai

The Honorable Cynthia K. Meyer presiding.

JONATHON FRANTZ
POST FALLS

LAW

Tara Malek
Jillian Caires

806 E. Polston Ave., Suite B
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
service@PostFallsLaw.com

Smith + Malek, PLLC
601 E. Front Ave., Suite 304
Coeur d’Alene, Idaho 83 8 1 4

Attorneyfor Appellant

Daniel

Womac

Fidelity National

701

5th

Seattle,

Law Group

Ave., Suite 2710

WA 98104

Attorneys for Respondent

Appellant’s Brief— Pg.

i

in

and

Table 0f Contents

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

............................................................................... 1

B.

SUMMARY 0F THE CASE ....................................................................................
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS .......................................................................

C.

STATEMENT OFFACTS ......................................................................................

2

FACTS REGARDING THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ..............................................

3

FACTS REGARDING THE PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES

8

A.

ON APPEAL
STANDARD OF REVIEW
ARGUMENT
ISSUES

1.

The

1

1

...........................................

............................................................................................

10

...................................................................................

11

..........................................................................................................

11

district court

standards setforth

in

abused its discretion byfailing tofollow the procedures and legal
C. §12-123 when it ordered sanctions against Mr. Frantz without

I.

hearing, 0r proper notice thereof.

.................................................................................. 1 1

when it ordered sanctions under 12-123 against Mr.
Frantz because a court may not sua Sponte make its own motionforfees pursuant t0 §12-123.
2.

Additionally, the district court erred

.........................................................................................................
3.
it

Even ifproper procedure and adequate notice was provided

the district court erred

applied an incorrect legal standard: the district court mistakenly believed a chain

was necessary

t0 prove

a non-express easement.

was

when

0ftz'tle

.............................................................

when

14

15

determined that n0 evidence 0f
ownership had been entered into the record because, at the hearing, the Plaintiff? provided

4.

Moreover, the

district court

clearly erroneous

uncontroverted oral evidence regarding ownership.

it

.........................................................

16

Mr. Frantz should not be sanctioned in connection with any misstatementsfound t0 be in
the Veriﬁed Motion ....................................................................................................... 20
5.

6.

Mr. Frantz was deprived ofdue process when sanctions were entered against him without

notice.
7.

.........................................................................................................................

.................

25

.......................................................................................................

25

Mr. Frantz should be awarded his attorney ’sfees pursuant

CONCLUSION

Appellant’s Brief— Pg.

24

ii

t0 I.C.§

12-121

Cases
Bird v. Bidwell, 209 P.3d 647 (Idaho 2009) ................................................................................. 14
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) ................................................................................ 24
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) .......................................................................................... 24

Mays v. District Court, 200 P. 115 (1921) .................................................................................... 24
Roe Family Services v. Doe, 88 P.3d 749 (Idaho 2004) ............................................................... 12
Rudd v. Rudd, 666 P.2d 639 (1983) .............................................................................................. 24
State

v.

Peterson, 340 P.2d 444 (1959) ......................................................................................... 24

Sun Valley Shopping

Idaho Power, 803 P.2d 993 (Idaho 1991) ................................. 11,
Urrutia v. Harrison, 330 P.3d 1035 (Idaho 2014) ........................................................................
Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Med. Ctr, 265 P.3d 502 (Idaho 201 1) ....................................
West v. Smith, 511 P.2d 1326 (Idaho 1973) ..................................................................................
Ctr.

v.

23
11

12

16

Statutes
§12-121
LC. §12-123
I.C.

8, 25
passim

..............................................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................................

Rules
I.R.C.P. Rule 11

1,

25

..................................................................................................................

24

........................................................................................................................

Constitutional Provisions
Idaho Const.

art. 1

Appellant’s Brief— Pg.

§13

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. SUMMARY 0F THE CASE
This case arose When, after the Mathis family had used a particular driveway for
residential access since the

mid

1980’s, the

new joint

owners, the Defendants (the “Osborns”),

placed concrete barriers across the driveway, installed a locked gate, and used an excavator t0
dig up a portion 0f the Mathis family’s driveway. While

gather together the ﬁnancial resources to ﬁle a

injunction. After denying the

suit,

when

it

took the Mathis family some time t0

they did, they ﬁled for a preliminary

motion for preliminary injunction, the Defendants moved for

attorneys fees against the Plaintiffs only for their costs in defending the preliminary injunction.

At

the hearing

0n Defendants’ motion

“as a professional courtesy,

we

for attorney fees, Defendants

its

that,

didn’t bring this as a motion for Rule 11 sanctions” against Mr.

Frantz. Regardless, in their next breath, the Defendants orally

exercising

acknowledged

moved

“the Court t0 consider

authority under Idaho Rule 0f Civil Procedure 11(c)(3).” Appellant, Mr. Frantz,

immediately obj ected on the basis that the procedures of Rule 11 had not been complied With and
the district court “noted” the obj ection.

Regardless, without any further procedure, without notice that Mr. Frantz’s conduct

under scrutiny, and Without affording Mr. Frantz an opportunity to present a defense, the
court awarded attorneys fees against the Plaintiffs

B.

and Mr. Frantz jointly and

was

district

severally.

COURSE 0F THE PROCEEDINGS
On January

11,

2019, Mr. Frantz represented the Mathis family in a preliminary

injunction hearing. After hearing testimony and taking evidence, the Court denied the request
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1

for a preliminary injunction

on January

16,

2019.

On March 27,

2019, Defendants ﬁled a motion

for attorney’s fees against the Plaintifﬁv only for the time spent defending against the Preliminary

N0

Injunction.

Frantz.

request

was made

t0 seek fees against Plaintiffs’ attorney, appellant

Mr. Frantz was given n0 notice

personally.

On June

5,

that sanctions or fees

2019, a Judgment was entered against

Jonathon

were sought against him,
all

the Plaintiffs and Jonathon

Frantz jointly and severally. Then, on September 16, 2019 the district court signed a Rule 54(b)
certiﬁcate

on the Judgment as

Plaintiffs,

Who were jointly and

t0

Jonthon Frantz only; the Judgment was not ﬁnal as t0 the

severally liable thereunder.

Mr. Frantz ﬁled his notice of appeal, which was originally ﬁled prematurely on August
19,

2019, was perfected

when the Rule

54(b) certiﬁcate

was appropriately executed

for the

judgment.
C.

STATEMENT OFFACTS
The

district court

granted attorney’s fees against Mr. Frantz because the district court

determined (albeit wrongly) that “their attorney did not

[]

perform

their

speak, to gather the documentary and other evidence necessary t0 prove
their claim.” R. 380.

employed

Because Mr. Frantz challenges

in ordering fees against

regarding the procedural deﬁciencies.

many 0f the

to

elements 0f

ﬁnding as well as procedures

Mr. Frantz, there are two different

this appeal: 1) the facts supporting the
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that

due diligence, so

sets

of facts important for

motion for a preliminary injunction, and 2) the

facts

FACTS REGARDING THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
1)

November

16, 2018: Plaintiff,

Brook Tracy, moved

and prelmiminary injunction allowing her

for a

temproary restraining order

t0 drive across the

Osborns’ property. R.

23-35.

2)

January

The

11, 2019:

district court

held a hearing regarding the motion for

preliminary injunction. At that hearing, the following evidence was submitted:

Evidencefrom

Plaintiﬁfs‘:

a.

Tracy Brook- Witness

Exhibit A1 from the preliminary injunction

is

a

map showing property

boundaries Which contain labels for three pieces 0f property: the “Tracy
Property,” the “Osborn Property,” and the “Mathis/Roll Property.”

Ms. Tracy and her brother currently own the Tracy Property.
Ms. Tracy and her brother inherited the property from

Tr. 1222-8.

their father

when he

passed away in 1997. Tr. 22: 12-18.

Ms. Tracy’s

father,

Mathis (Ricky’s

Ricky Mathis, obtained the Tracy Property from Calvin

father).

The Osborn Property

is

Tr. 20:8-12.

owned and occupied by the Osborns.

Tr. 1229-16.

1

Appellant notes that Deputy Clerk 0f the District Court 0f the First Judicial District, Katherine
“will be submitted as EXHIBITS t0 the Record.” R. 399.
Hayden, certiﬁes that Exhibit

A

However, Appellant has not been provided any way t0 make reference to those exhibits other
than t0 refer t0 them by their alphanumeric character used at the hearing on the preliminary
injunction.
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f.

The Mathis/Roll Property
and Laura R011.

g.

is

occupied by Gailord Mathis, Rebecca Stafford,

Tr. 12:17-24.

Calvin Mathis owned the Tracy Property, the Mathis/Roll Property, and the

Osborn Property

as

one parcel since

Tr. 15: 19

Calvin Mathis

i.

Ms. Brook, her parents, and her
Tracy Property in 1987.

siblings

Tr. 17:12

—

moved

into a trailer

16: 17.

Ms. Brook lived 0n the Tracy Property from 1987 — 2003.

k.

During

that entire time,

“Osborn Driveway” the

house on the

18:20.

j.

1.

-

off the Tracy Property in the 1980’s. Tr. 16:19-25?

h.

split

at least the 1980’s.

Tr. 18:21

—

19:1.

Ms. Brook’s family used the driveway labeled
entire time. Tr. 23:

1

8

— 24:4.

Ms. Brook, personally, moved back 0n the Tracy Property

in 2017. Tr. 24:5-

13.

m. Ms. Brook was forced
the Osborns placed

to leave the property in

cement

barriers

Summer/Fall of 2018 because

and a gate over her driveway blocking her

access to the Tracy Property. Tr. 24:21

—

25:6; see also Exhibit

B

& C (Tr.

2625-16, and Tr. 27: 1-10).

n.

Ms. Brook had three children ages

0.

There was another skid

trail that

road, however, that driveway

2

It

may be worth noting that there was an

and there was never any motion
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10, 12,

and

14.

Tr. 29:18-25.

led from the Tracy Property to another public

was not drivable by regular

obj ection, but

it

was made

to strike the answer. R. 17:

1

-4.

vehicle. Tr. 30:22

after the complete

answer

—

37:8; see also Exhibits D, E,

and F (photos of the skid road); see also

Tr.

50:16-20.

Evidencefrom

Gailord Mathis- Witness

Plaintiffs:

p.

Mr. Gailord Mathis (“Gailord”) was raised 0n the property

at issue.

Tr.

52:20

53:1.

While Gailord was growing up, the Tracy Property, Osborn Property, and the
Mathis/Roll Property were

all

“one piece” owned by Gailord’s

father.

Tr.

53:2-8.

Gailord’s father acquired the property (as one piece) in the late 1960’s. Tr.

67:15

—

68:

1.

Gailord was

Tr. 52:18-19.

Gailord built the driveway labled 0n Exhibit
1978. Tr. 53:23

—

The driveway was

54:1

A as the Osborn Driveway in

1.

initially built t0 serve as

access for Gailord’s cabin. Tr.

56: 12-19.

Gailord lived in the cabin and used the Osborn Driveway as access from 1982

—
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1997. Tr. 58:19

—

59:13.

w. The Tracy Property and the Osborn Property were
1983 from the Mathis/Roll Property. Tr. 68:7-1
x.

In 1983, after being split off, the

Tr.

Plaintiffs: Travis

y.

see also Tr. 69:9-12.3

Osborn Property was owned by Laura

R011.

it

was parcelled out”

in 1983).

Mathis- Witness

While growing up (through the 80’s and 90’s) the Osborn Property was owned

by Laura
z.

off in approximately

74:23-25 (Gailord testiﬁes that Laura Roll became the owner of the

Osborn Property “when
Evidencefrom

1;

split

R011. Tr. 91 23-16.

Travis Mathis lived 0n the Tracy Property from 1987

— 1997 while

a youth.

Tr. 85:17-20.

Evidencefrom Defendants: Jodi Bland— Witness
aa.

The Osborn Property was acquired by Ms. Bland’s mother

in 2002. Tr. 97:8-

14.

3)

January 12-16, 2019: The
Tr.

3

203:24 — 204:2 (the

The testimony references

district court

district court

engages in

its

own

investigation of the facts.

searched Kootenai County

map

tools t0 see

“three parcels” being split off: the Tracy Property, the

Property, and a third property

which

is

who

Osborn

not labeled in Exhibit A, Which unlabeled property

is

irrelevant to this appeal.
4

See Idaho Code 0f Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.9(D) (“A judge shall not investigate facts in a
matter independently, and shall consider only the evidence presented. .”). The information
.

gathered by the district court could not be refuted by the Plaintiffs because they were wholly
that such information was being considered. It was not until after the court’s opinion

unaware

was reached that the Plaintiffs were aware
presented by the parties.
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that the district court

was looking

at facts

not

4

Kootenai County assessor

(the district court researched other cases in

4)

January

The

16, 2019:

owner); see also Tr. 21 1 :23

listed as the property

district court

Which the

entered

oral

its

parties

were

— 212:3

litigants).

ﬁndings regarding the

preliminary injunction hearing and denied the motion. The district court

made

the

following statements:

i.

“.
.

.while there

was some testimony concerning

which makes analysis 0f the

into evidence,

various easement theories difﬁcult, if not impossible.” Tr. 203

ii.

“So a timeline 0f the

out of

were actually n0 chain of title

the property in about 1983, there

documents submitted

[the] parceling

parties’ use.

..

Based 0n the testimony

:

1

8-23.

at the

hearing last week, a timeline 0f the parties’ use 0f the Osborn

driveway

is

as follows: ’83 t0 ’85, Gailord used the

Osborn property.

It’s

unclear in

whose name

title

driveway 0n the

to the

Osborn

property was held. ’85 t0 ’89, Gailord used the driveway t0 access the
cabin,

which was now — 0r

at the

time 0n the

map

and he used the driveway regularly. From ’89
driveway

to access the cabin intermittently.

his family

Tr.

iii.

t0 ’94, Gailord

1987

to 2007,

used the

Ricky and

the driveway t0 access the Tracy property.”

208224 — 209:13.

“Indeed, the Court cannot determine

that title

Appellant’s Brief— Pg. 7

members used

as the R011 property,

when title was

severed 0r even

was severed without a proper chain 0f title.”

Tr. 216:9-12.

FACTS REGARDING THE PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES
1)

January

11, 2019:

The

district court

preliminary injunction. Tr.

2)

January

16, 2019:

The

holds a hearing regarding the Mathis’s

3.

district court orally

denies the Mathis’s motion for a

preliminary injunction. Tr. 225: 2-3.

3)

January

31, 2019:

The

district court signs a written

order denying the motion for

preliminary injunction. R. 49.

4)

March

27, 2019:

The Osboms move

for attorneys fees for defending against the

preliminary junction under I.C. §§12-121, and 123. R. 111. The Osborns do not
include any notice that they are seeking fees against Jonathon Frantz. R. 114-128 (the

Osborns’

memorandum

supporting their motion for fees

is

devoid 0f any reference t0

seeking fees against Counsel, Jonathon Frantz); see also R. 380 (“Defendants’ motion
seeks attorney’s fees against the Plaintiffs themselves.

5)

April

3,

.”).

2019: The Mathises object to the motion for fees. R. 138. There

request for attorney’s fees against Mr. Frantz. R. 138

6)

.

—

At

that hearing,

is

held. Tr. 232.

Counsel for the Osborns admits the no motion was ﬁled

against Mr. Frantz, but then orally

moves

the court t0 grant sanctions based

I.R.C.P. 11. Mr. Frantz immediately obj ected

procedure has not been followed, and the
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no

156.

April 10, 2019: The hearing regarding the Osborns’ motion for fees
a.

is

on the grounds

district court

0n

that the proper

noted Mr. Frantz’s

objection. Tr. 290: 9-23.

The exchange occurred

after the evidentiary portion

of the hearing had closed, and went as follows:

As

a profestional courtesy,

we

didn’t bring this as a motion for Rule

motion
Miss Tracy did not understand the
nuances and the construction of the document, perhaps then the
Court should, and we respectfully ask the Court t0 consider
exercising its authority under Idaho Rule 0f Civil Procedure
11 sanctions, but perhaps, if the Court determines that this

was pursued

frivolously and that

11(c)(3).

MR. FRANTZ:

Judge, there’s a lot 0f procedures there that

I

don’t

think ought to be considered at this time.

MISS CAIRES:

11(C)(3) allows the Court t0 consider

without a motion pending before

it

on

its

own

it.5

THE COURT: Your objection is noted.
Tr. 290: 9-23.

7)

June

3,

2019: The

district court enters its

Osborn Defendants’ Motion

Memorandum Decision and Order 0n

for Attorney’s Fees. R. 365-87. In

Decision, the district court sua sponte raises

its

own

its

Memorandum

claim for fees under I. C. §12-

I23. R. 385 (“Defendants d0 not raise this in their motion for attorney’s fees, but

its

own motion,

the court will discuss this issue.”). In that very

0n

same memorandum

decision, the court grants sanctions against Mr. Frantz pursuant to the issues that the

court had just simultaneously raised 0n

5

its

own motion

in

its

decision. R. 385-387.

This statement of the law regarding I.R.C.P. 11(c)(3) is inaccurate. For a court to consider Rule
11 sanctions 0n its own, it must issue a motion to show cause.

Appellant’s Brief— Pg. 9

June

8)

5,

2019: The

district court enters

a judgment awarding attorneys fees against the

Mathises and Mr. Frantz jointly and severally.

July 12, 2019: The

9)

district court grants

judgment against Jonathon Frantz only
the Mathises,

10) Dateless:

Who have joint and

At n0 point

is

an order for a 54(b) certiﬁcate on the
(the order is not certiﬁed

ﬁnal as

it

applies to

several liability). R. 3 1 8.

there ever any notice, hearing, or order t0

show cause

regarding Whether or not fees should be assessed against Mr. Frantz.6

ISSUES
a.

ON APPEAL

Did the

District Court err

when

granted sanctions against Jonathon Frantz?

it

by

District Court err

Did the

District

by moving sua sponte

Did the

Court

failing to follow the procedures set forth in I.C.

for sanctions pursuant t0 I.C.

by requiring a chain of title

err

§12-123

§12-123?

in order to decide if there

was a

non-eXpress easement?

Did the

District

non-documentary evidence 0f

Court

err

by

Court

err

by sanctioning Mr. Frantz

failing t0 consider the

ownership?

Did the

District

for the misstatements

of the

Plaintiffs?

Did the
against

Is

6

There

is

District Court err by depriving Mr. Frantz of due process by granting
him without proper notice and an opportunity to be heard?

and costs 0n appeal?

Jonathon Frantz entitled

t0 attorney’s fees

n0

because the record

citation t0 the record

the lack 0f any evidence of such in the record

or order t0

show cause was ever
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ﬁled.

sanctions

is

devoid 0f any such item. Instead,

Which demonstrates

that

n0 such hearing,

it is

notice,

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Statutory attorney fee awards, as well as an award 0f sanctions under Rule 11, are subject

to

an abuse 0f discretion standard 0f review.” Urrutia

v.

Harrison, 330 P.3d 1035, 1038 (Idaho

2014) (citations omitted). “To determine Whether the court abused
inquire: ‘(1)

the

trial

Whether the

trial

court acted within the outer boundaries 0f

decision

by an exercise 0f reason.”’

In reviewing fee awards

court’s

ﬁnding

t0

determine

discretion, this

Court must

court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) Whether

its

standards applicable t0 the speciﬁc choices available t0

its

its

if

discretion and consistently With the legal

it;

and

(3)

Whether the

court reached

Id. (citation omitted).

0n appeal, the Supreme Court’s function

it is

trial

“is t0

review the

supported by the record.” Sun Valley Shopping Ctr.

v.

trial

Idaho

Power, 803 P.2d 993, 998 (Idaho 1991) (emphasis added).

ARGUMENT
1.

The

district court

abused

standards setforth in

I.

C.

its

discretion byfailing tofollow the procedures

§12-123 when

it

and legal

ordered sanctions against Mr. Frantz without

hearing, orproper notice thereof

Idaho code requires that before a court can enter an order for fees under section 12-123,

must provide notice

t0 the party 0r attorney

§12-123(b) speciﬁcally sets forth

allegedly engaged in friviolous conduct. LC.

that,

An award 0f reasonable attorney’s
motion of a party

who

t0 a civil action,

fees may be made by the court upon the
but only after the court does the following:

(i)

(ii)

Gives notice of the date 0f the hearing t0 each partv or counsel 0f
record who allegedly engaged in frivolous conduct. ..
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it

Additionally, the court shall allow the parties and counsel 0f record

(iii)

involved to present any other relevant evidence

An award 0f fees pursuant t0 I.C.

(emphasis added).

See Roe Family Services

notice, 0r a hearing.

v.

at the hearing.

§12-123

is

improper

“where a

statute

.

.

.

is

plain, clear,

was no motion,

and unambiguous,

and must be given the interpretation the language clearly implies.” Verska
Regional Med.

Ctr.,

265 P.3d 502, 508 (Idaho 201

In this particular case, the statute

granted, notice

fees against

is

very

fact, at

it

notice, 0r

‘speaks for itslef

v. St.

Alphonsus

1) (citations omitted).

clear.

If sanctions

must be given. There was never any notice

Mr. Frantz. In

no motion,

Doe, 88 P.3d 749, 757 (Idaho 2004)

(overturning an award of fees pursuant to LC. § 12-123 because there
hearing). Moreover,

if there is

that the

under 12-123 are to be

Osborns sought attorney’s

the hearing, counsel for the Osborns admitted that “as a

professional courtesy” they did not ﬁle any motion against Mr. Frantz. Tr. 29029-16. Then, in
the

same sentence, they
At

that

move

the district court for sanctions pursuant t0 I.R.C.P. 11(c).

moment, Mr. Frantz placed
Mr. Frantz

right then an there.

and a hearing]

orally

that

I

his obj ection

on the record

stated, “Judge, there’s a lot

any such consideration

t0

0f procedures there [such as notice

don’t think ought t0 be considered at this time.”

Moreover, Mr. Frantz understood that he was only arguing and presenting evidence 0n
behalf 0f the Plaintiffs. At the hearing, Mr. Frantz concluded, “Judge,
clients

with sanctions 0n

plaintiffs, forgive

this.

.”
.

Tr. 288: 4-5.

Mr. Frantz also

I

ask that you don’t hit

stated, “I

have not treated — the

me, have not treated the preliminary injunction hearing as a

mission.” Tr. 274: 14-16.
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my

fact

ﬁnding

The

recognized that the Osborns only sought fees against the Plaintiffs,

district court, too,

and not counsel. See R. 380 (“Defendants’ motion seeks attorney’s fees against the
themselves.

.

.”).

At

that hearing,

Mr. Frantz was unaware that he would be potentially

any ﬁnding under the Osborns motion for
have presented evidence in his

Even
do not raise

in its

own

this in their

was

raising

evidence offerred

own motion].

.”
.

made

at the

is

motion for attorney’s

new

issues.

The

Of course n0
at issue.

was

fees, but

Frantz been aware 0f such, he would

raising

on

its

new issues.

own

continued by noting

it

was

raised.

own motion in the very same

memorandum

that,

“There was n0

hearing regarding [the issue raised by the court 0n

evidence was offerred

When issues

at the hearing;

it

its

Mr. Frantz did not

are raised for the ﬁrst time in the

simply no opportunity for a party to respond t0

same time

R. 385 (“Defendants

motion, the court will

district court, as late as in the

district court

at the attorney’s fees

R. 385.

The

memorandum

because the decision has been

Mr. Frantz was clearly deprived of his right to notice and a

hearing as the district court acknowledged in

As

Had Mr.

ruling, the district court

know that the conduct was
decision, there

fees.

liable for

own behalf.

discuss this issue.” (emphasis added)).
decision,

Plaintiffs

its

own

opinion that

it

was

raising

new

issues

0n

its

order settling that same motion.

such, because the plain language of the statutes

were not followed, and because due

process rights were trampled, and the necessary procedures did not take place, the award 0f fees

was improper. Consequently,
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this

Court should reverse the judgment of the

district court.

2.

Additionally, the district court erred

Frantz because a court

when

it

ordered sanctions under 12-123 against Mr.

may not sua Sponte make

its

own motionforfees pursuant

t0

§12-

123.

Next, the court abused
district court

this in their

385.

The

noted in

its

its

the legal standards available.

memorandum decision that even though the “Defendants d0

motion for attorney’s

district court

by going outside

discretion

was

fees,

further

[]

aware

0n

its

own motion,

that the

The

not raise

the court will discuss the issue.” R.

Defendants had not ﬁled sanctions against

Attorney, Mr. Frantz. R. 380 (“Defendants’ motion seeks attorney’s fees against the Plaintiffs

themselves based 0n the misrepresentations revealed by gross inconsistencies between the

Veriﬁed Motion statements and testimony

elicited at the preliminary injunction hearing”).

However, LC. §12-123 does not allow a court
§12-123 sanctions. Instead, §12-123(2)(b)
fees

It

may be made by the

court

sets forth that

does not contemplate a court raising such a motion on

speciﬁcally authorized to

make

civil action only.

the motion

on

its

on

t0

its

a

own motion,

civil action.”

own; the

ﬁle for

attorney’s

(emphasis added).

statute is limited to

Conversely, in I.R.C.P. 11(c)(3) a court

own. LC. §12-123 contains n0 such

language. Moreover, this court has interpreted §12-123 according t0

v.

its

“An award 0f reasonable

upon the motion Ofa party

responding to a request by a party in a
is

t0 sua sponte,

its

plain language. See Bird

Bidwell, 209 P.3d 647, 650 (Idaho 2009) (recognizing that 12-123 does not apply to an

appellate court because “by

ofjudgment

its

terms” 12-123 must be

commenced Within 21 days

after the entry

in a civil action.)

on

its

own motion,

issues 0f sanctions. Yet, the district court granted sanctions pursuant t0

its

own raised

The

plain language of LC. §12-123 does not allow a court to,
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raise

issues

pursuant to 12-123. There was never any analysis 0r discussion in the

memorandum

decision addressing I.R.C.P. 11.

Therefore, the district court abused

its

discretion because

with the appropriate legal standards. Therefore,

3.

district court’s

its

it

did not operate consistently

decision should be reversed.

Even ifproper procedure and adequate notice was provided, the district court erred when it
applied an incorrect legal standard: the district court mistakenly believed a chain 0ftitle was
necessary t0 prove a non-express easement.
In ﬁnding that the Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction

was

frivolous, the district

court errantly believed that a prescriptive easement or implied easement required documentary

evidence in the form 0f a chain 0f title. The

The

district court consistently

held

that,

remains that they lacked the necessary evidence at the preliminary
injunction hearing t0 show how the property was titled, and when different pieces
fact

0f the property was titled in others, and they failed t0 offer any evidence as t0
other necessary elements such as separation 0f title 0r intent to establish an

easement (implied easement); separation 0f title, reasonable necessity at time of
separation, great present necessity (easement by necessity); and use that is open
and notorious, continuous and uninterrupted, adverse and under a claim of right,
with actual or constructive knowledge 0f the owner (prescriptive easement).
This complete lack 0f preparation
Frantz.

.

.

.

It

is

attributable to the Plaintiffs, but also to

would not have been “nice”

t0

have the chain 0f title.”

It

Mr.

was

absolutelv essential...
R. 386 (emphasis added). The district court had earlier repeated

its

mantra that a chain of title

is

absolutely necessary. See Tr. 203:18-23 (“there were actually n0 chain of title documents

submitted into evidence, Which makes analysis of the various easement theories difﬁcult,

impossible”); see also Tr. 216:9-12 (“Indeed, the Court cannot determine

severed 0r even that

Nowhere

in

title

title

was

was severed without a proper chain 0f title”).

any controlling law

in order t0 successfully prosecute
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when

m

is

there a requirement that a party provide a chain 0f title

an easement case. Nowhere in any controlling law

is

there a

prohibition against relying

form 0f evidence, the

There

is

district court

that a chain

considering that there

oral evidence.

oral evidence regarding

was uncontroverted. The
wrongly believed

0n

While perhaps

ownership provided by the

0f title for the properties

at issue

was a

When it

necessity, especially

was evidence presented regarding ownership.

n0 requirement

any way. Cf West

Plaintiffs at the hearing

acted outside the bounds of its discretion

that

you provide a chain of title

In fact, Idaho recognizes prescriptive easements in gross,

in

oral evidence is the least reliable

v.

to

prove a non-express easement.

Which are not

tied t0 a

dominant

estate

Smith, 511 P.2d 1326, 1332-33 (Idaho 1973). For a prescriptive

easement in gross, n0 use tied

to a

dominant parcel need be demonstrated by the evidence. At

the very least, without the evidence as t0 the ownership of the Tracy Property, the district court

could have found any resulting easement t0 be

As

such, since the district court abused

standard, the

injunction

judgment

was

in

its

for attorney’s fees (based

frivolous because there

gross instead of appurtenant.
discretion

by applying an

0n the opinion

that the

incorrect legal

motion for a preliminary

was n0 evidence of a chain of title submitted) should be

reversed.

4.

Moreover, the district court was clearly erroneous when it determined that n0 evidence 0f
ownership had been entered into the record because, at the hearing, the Plaintiffs provided
uncontroverted oral evidence regarding ownership.

Moreover, any ﬁnding that the
(as

it

Plaintiffs’

arguments regarding ownership 0f the property

applies to the non-express easement theories)

were Without

erroneous because the Plaintiffs submitted the following
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title

factual support is clearly

history evidence:

1.

Gailord’s father acquired
1960’s. Tr. 67: 15

2.

3.

—

all

the referened/relevant properties (as one piece) in the late

68:1 (testimony from Gailord).

Gailord built the driveway

The Tracy Property and

at issue in

the

1978. Tr. 53:23

Osborn Property were

—

split

54:1

1.

off in approximately 1983 from

the Mathis/Roll Property. Tr. 68:7-11 (Gailord’s testimony); see also Tr. 69:9-12

(Gailord’s testimony); see also Tr. 16: 19-25 (corroborating testimony from Ms. Tracy).

4.

Osborn Property was owned by Laura R011. Tr. 74:2325 (Gailord testiﬁes that Laura R011 became the owner 0f the Osborn Property “when it
was parcelled out” which occurred in 1983); see also Tr. 91 23-16.

5.

After being split off, the Tracy Property

6.

In 1983, after being split off, the

was owned by Ricky Mathis (Ms. Tracy’s

father).

Tr. 1925-24; see also Tr. 20:8-12.

In 1997

Ricky Mathis passed away and the property transferred

Brook Tracy and

t0

Travis Mathis. Tr. 22: 12-18.

Booth acquired the Osborn Property.

7.

In 2002, Joan

8.

In 2017, the estate of Joan

Unfortunately,

we d0

not

Tr. 110: 14-23.

Booth sold the Osborn Property

know Whether the

district court failed t0

aforementioned evidence presented 0f ownership because
chain of title) was mandatory; because

it

t0 the Osborns. Tr. 11226-14.

it

felt that

consider the

documentary evidence

simply forgot the evidence; or because

it

(Le. a

found the

evidence not credible7. Either way, however, the motion for preliminary injunction was
supported by

facts.

the record because

7

I

would note

that

not credible. But

More

importantly, those facts were never disputed! (there

you cannot

it is

cite to

something that

obvious that the

district court

is

is

n0

citation to

not there).

found various statements by the

Plaintiffs

not clear if the referenced statements by the trial court regarding the
history were also determined by the district court to not be credible 0r untrue.
it is
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title

To

the extent that

evidence insufﬁcient,
attorney’s fees

to fail t0

fact.

is

determined that the

there

is

insufficient evidence presented t0

entirely different

only under the later scenario Where fees

one where the

district court

found the above mentioned oral

should also be noted that LC. §12-123 does

meet your burden, and an

It is

matter

when

it

it is

Plaintiffs’

n_0t

authorize the granting 0f

meet one’s burden.

It is

one thing

one t0 argue something not supported

may be

in

granted under section 12-123. If the

evidence was insufﬁcient, attorney’s fees under 12-123 are

inappropriate.

In this case, at the preliminary injunction hearing the Mathises put

element of various easement theories. The

district court actually

made

0n evidence 0f every

a signiﬁcant ﬁnding

important t0 entering a preliminary injunction 0n the basis of prescription:

So a timeline 0f the parties’ use. .. 1987 t0 2007, Ricky and his family members
[Brook Tracy and Travis Mathis] used the driveway t0 access the Tracy property.
Tr.

208224 — 209: 13. The

district court

found that Brook Tracy and Travis Mathis’s family had

used the driveway continuously and uninterrupted for 20 years. There was n0 evidence that the
use was permissive; moreover, there was evidence that

it

was made with

the

knowledge of the

owner. Tr. 78: 12-21. The photos 0f the driveway (primarily the aerial photo comprising EX. A)

show that the driveway was obvious and noticeable. Gailord testiﬁed
“about 14 feet wide.” Tr. 63:17-18.

You
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driveway was

could see the driveway and the vehicles driving on

from the home located on the Osborn Property.
driveway was open and notorious.

that the

Tr. 40:13-18.

it

The Mathis family’s use 0f the

Additionally, this

is all

against the backdrop that the Osborns

were not challenging the

ownership 0f the various properties and that the Osborns never actually raised that argument.
See Tr. 171 :23

-

181 :23 (the Osborns’ closing arguments at the preliminary injunction hearing

are void of any such challenge to the sufﬁciency of the evidence of ownership).

The Osborns

never presented any conﬂicting evidence as to the ownership dates; never questioned the
Plaintiffs about

it

during the hearing; never raised any issues regarding lack of proof of

ownership during closing arguments; and never raised those issues in their opposition to the
preliminary injunctiong The evidence was uncontroverted.

Consequently, the

district court

abused

its

failed t0 account for the uncontroverted evidence

Had the

district court

discretion

by

failing to exercise reason. It

0f ownership that was submitted

at the hearing.

considered that evidence (0r at least the fact that such evidence was

submitted) the court could not have reached a reasoned conclusion that the Plaintiffs failed to

have any factual support for

their motion. Therefore, the

judgment

for sanctions pursuant to 12-

123 (based on a ﬁnding that Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion was without foundation 0r
support) should be reversed.

8

It

should be noted that the Osborns’ opposition t0 the preliminary injunction

record. Regardless, there

is

n0 evidence

actually raised the lack of a chain of title as a problem.
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is

not a part 0f the

in the record that could demonstrate that the

Osborns

5.

Mr. Fram‘Z Should not be sanctioned
Verified Motion

The

district court

in

connection with any misstatementsfound t0 be in the

sanctioned Mr. Frantz for essentially two reasons:

1) for his

alleged

“complicity” in writing the Veriﬁed Motion, and 2) his failure t0 be prepared for the preliminary
injunction hearing

by not providing a chain 0f title. The

been addressed above. Therefore, Mr. Frantz Will
the

issue regarding the chain 0f title has

now review the

issues with the statements in

Veriﬁed Motion.

The Veriﬁed Motion

The

ﬁrst bit of conduct that the district court addressed

was What

the court

saw

as

misleading testimony.

0n the motion for preliminary injunction, the court
Veriﬁed Motion t0 indicate that the Tracy family lived at 8531 W.
Highland Drive for 19 years, that in August 2017, the Osborns blocked the
driveway t0 the Tracy property, and that as a result, the Tracys 10st vehicular
In preparing for the hearing
interpreted the

access t0 their property, resulting in Children potentially missing the school bus,

and the Tracys being forced
barriers

was

t0

move from the property until the

issue 0f the

resolved, causing signiﬁcant ﬁnancial hardship.

R. 384. The district court’s general understanding 0f the matter at the time

preliminary injunction hearing matched Attorney Jonathon Frantz’s

time the Veriﬁed Motion was signed and submitted. In
surprised than the court

When he

realized that

fact,

it

prepared for the

own understanding

at the

Mr. Frantz was probably more

Ms. Tracy did not move back onto the Tracy

Property until after the gate was locked and the concrete barriers were placed. Mr. Frantz’s

understanding was that Ms. Tracy had lived 0n the property in her youth, but that (now being
married) had

moved her own
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family (her husband and children) back t0 the Tracy Property

When

the Osborns placed the blockade in her way. In fact, Mr. Frantz took this matter

discounted basis because the

facts, as

0n a heavily

he understood them, seemed quite unjust. However, Mr.

Frantz never put any evidence of the foregoing before the district court because he did not
that

he was proverbially “0n

and

trial”

at risk

0f being sanctioned.

Moreover, the ﬁnding that Mr. Frantz helped “type up” the Veriﬁed Motion
consistent With the evidence and

fees, the

is

know

is

not

unsupported by Ms. Tracy’s testimony. At the hearing on

following questions were put to Ms. Tracy,

Miss Tracy, did you

Q.

draft the

[Veriﬁed Motion]?

Yes.

You

drafted this legal

You mean,

?DPQP

like,

N0, you wrote

document?

rough drafted

this

document

it?

that

was ﬁled with

the Court?

Oh, no.
Tr. 254: 15-18.

Ms. Tracy testiﬁed

that she

wrote the “rough draft” for the Veriﬁed Motion.

course, she didn’t prepare the heading.

Q.

Do you know the name

A.

Ithink

Tr. 255:

1,

it’s

of who drafted

it?

Christine.

10.

Q.

Okay. Did you draft paragraph one?

A.

Did

Q.

Yeah. Did you write paragraph one as

I

write
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it?

it

reads 0n this document?

Yes or no?

Of

guess. Idon’t

A.

N0,

Q.

Yes 0r n0?

A.

I

I

didn’t physically write

physically typed
Tr. 260: 1-16.

know.

From

it

it,

out, but

the testimony,

it is

but

I

I

told

clear that

sworn statement

in the

0f the

is

no

So, the district court abused

one was crafted carefully by
that

client(s)

it

did not raise any red ﬂags because

to facts that

t0 rely

At

discretion

When it reached the

and attorney

was no evidence

his client’s

0f when the driveway was constructed,

t0

Mr. Frantz drafted the Veriﬁed Motion

that time, there

0n

is

that

it

he could not otherwise
etc.).

conclusion that “paragraph

mislead the court.

.”
.

(R. 382), because the

not supported by the record. Instead, the

record shows that “Kristen” typed what Ms. Tracy dictated and then that
Frantz.

and they

it.

Mr. Frantz had the right

register

its

t0 put,

t0 “Kristen” 0r “Christine” the alleged facts.9

Veriﬁed Motion With regard

independently investigate (there

ﬁnding

facts.

What

Mr. Frantz did not prepare the wording for the

Sure, Mr. Frantz reviewed the Veriﬁed Motion, but

his understanding

-- like,

didn’t physically type

Veriﬁed Motion. Instead, Ms. Tracy dictated

matched with

them what

was reviewed by Mr.

Mr. Frantz possessed Which would controvert

any of the sworn statements made by Ms. Tracy.

9

The record is unclear as t0 who 0r what position “Kristen” 0r “Christine” holds at Post Falls
Law. However, that is because Mr. Frantz (and Post Falls Law) was not put 0n notice that their
conduct was at issue. Had Mr. Frantz been aware of such, he certainly would have clariﬁed the
record. However, in light of the fact that the proceedings were against the Plaintiffs only, the
position held and/or who Kristen is was not material or relevant.

Appellant’s Brief— Pg.

22

Unfortunately, the district court got focused 0n Whether 0r not the Veriﬁed Motion

misleading, not 0n Whether Mr. Frantz

knew

at the time he signed the Veriﬁed Motion that

v.

(“we conclude

gave

was

incorrect”). This, 0f course,

was

all

opportunity to put on evidence as to his

it

was

Idaho Power, 803 P.2d 993, 1000-02 (Idaho 1991)

misleading. See Sun Valley Shopping Ctr.
that the focus the trial court

was

t0 the

make 0f the

choice

[t0

award sanctions]

the result 0f the fact that Mr. Frantz did not have an

own understanding

of the facts as he knew them

at the

time he ﬁled the Veriﬁed Motion.

As

testiﬁed t0

by Ms. Tracy, she

dictated

What was supposed

t0

be written, and then she

met With her attorney (presumably Mr. Frantz) regarding her testimony. Taking the
example 0f paragraph one, When Mr. Frantz reviewed
t0

d0

t0 verify the veracity

0f that statement? His

Other than the paragraph numbering,

legalese.

it

client dictated

how Mr.
was

after reading

Frantz could or should have

it.

What

It is

else

was he required

not packed with

reads like a lay person’s testimony.

evidence that supported any contrary understanding.

Mr. Frantz have performed

that paragraph

court’s

What

He had n0

further investigation could/should

paragraph one? There was never any discussion about

known that paragraph one was misleading

at the

time

it

ﬁled.

Since the focus of the
at the

trial

court

was

in error (by failing t0 look at

time the Veriﬁed Motion was prepared), the

district court

abused

what Mr. Frantz knew

its

discretion in awarding

sanctions against Mr. Frantz. Therefore, the judgment of the district court should be reversed.
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6.

Mr. Fram‘Z was deprived ofdue process when sanctions were entered against him without
notice.

In

is

Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho

112, 666 P.2d 639 (1983) this Court stated,

also guaranteed under the Idaho Constitution.

liberty or property Without

It

reads:

‘No person

due process of law." Idaho Const.

shall

art. 1, § 13.

“Due process 0f law

be

deprived 0f life,

The due process

guarantees derived from both the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution are
substantially the same. State

The

Peterson, 81 Idaho 233, 340 P.2d 444 (1959).

v.

right to procedural

due process guaranteed under both the Idaho and United States

Constitutions requires that a person involved in the judicial process be given meaningful notice

and a meaningful opportunity
L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Boddie
(1971);

Mays

v.

v.

t0

be heard. See Fuentes

In the instant case, Mr. Frantz

t0

was

This

is

opportunity to be heard,

24

S.Ct. 1983,

32

200

P. 115 (1921).”

be heard.

A Judgment for $7,515 is against him without him
until the

memorandum

decision

was entered by

the

contrary t0 both the United States and Idaho Constitutions. Therefore,

since the district court abused
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407 U.S. 67, 92

essentially deprived 0f his property Without giving

even knowing he was a target for sanctions
district court.

Shevin,

Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113

District Court, 34 Idaho 200,

him notice and an opportunity

v.

its

its

discretion

by

failing to provide

Mr. Frantz with notice and an

judgment ordering sanctions against Mr. Frantz must be reversed.

7.

Mr. Fram‘Z Should be awarded his attorney ’sfees pursuant

t0 I.C.§

12-121

Mr. Frantz should also be awarded his attorney’s fees and costs pursuant
because any defense to

aware

that they

this appeal

had not sought

t0

LC. §12-121

can only be brought Without foundation. The Osborns were

fees against

Mr. Frantz; they acknowledged such in

arguments, and then in the same breath asked the

district court t0

motion for sanctions against Mr. Frantz When the

clear,

black

consider making

letter

their oral

its

own

law of both §12-123 and

Rule 11 require notice and hearings thereon.
Moreover,

at

n0 point did the Osborns ever challenge the sufﬁciency 0r veracity 0f the

evidence regarding the

title.

T0 suddenly now oppose

those points,

when

they were unopposed

by Osborns’ below, would be unreasonable.
Therefore, this Court should enter an order granting attorney’s fees t0 Mr. Frantz for his
costs prosecuting this appeal pursuant to

LC. 12-121.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, because the court failed to follow proper procedures, did not act

consistently with the applicable legal standards, and failed to exercise reason

decision, this Court should reverse the

judgment 0f the

district court,

When

it

reached

its

which granted sanctions

against Jonathon Frantz.
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